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1 The title of  Marianne Noble’s  new book lays out unambiguously her bold ambition,
which is no less than to “rethink sympathy and human contact.” After exploring The
Masochistic  Pleasures  of  Sentimental  Literature in  her first  monograph (2000),  she now
offers  to  investigate  the  ways  in  which  four  writers  from  the  1850s  and  1860s  –
 Hawthorne,  Douglass,  Stowe,  and  Dickinson  – revisited  and  revised  their  initial
understanding of sympathy over the course of their careers. Her method consists in
focusing  on  these  authors’  engagement  with  sympathy  in  their  “second  and  third
books” (4) and, in the case of Dickinson, in her poetry from the early 1860s compared to
earlier letters and poems. The delimitation of her corpus brings into view the larger
framework of her project, which, as her key verb “rethink” suggests, is essentially of a
revisionary  nature.  In  her  view,  the  field  of  nineteenth-century  American  literary
studies is saturated with critiques of sympathy to the point of exhaustion. In the wake
of Lauren Berlant’s pioneering work, many scholars such as Kristin Boudreau, Elizabeth
Duquette,  Lloyd  Pratt,  and  others  have  indeed  sought  to  expose  the limits  of  the
antebellum culture of sympathy whose pernicious effect is, or so the critical consensus
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goes, to “[siphon] energy away from political engagement and channeling it toward
tender  feelings”  (4).  Yet  as  Noble  argues,  these  critics  often  rely  on  a  series  of
conceptual  reductions  and  substitutions  which  eventually  lead  them  to  dismiss
sympathy as such, instead of recognizing that their target is in fact only one in several
modes of sympathy. Drawing on a wide range of contemporary affect theorists and
philosophers, Noble demonstrates that Berlant and her epigones understand sympathy
exclusively as “affective epistemology” (6), where identification is predicated on the
possibility to know the other’s inner feelings. This entails violating the other’s integrity
“with narrow, probing eyes,” as Dickinson says (F 550), and ultimately denying them
their singularity. For Noble on the contrary, what brings Hawthorne, Douglass, Stowe,
and Dickinson together is a shared commitment to sympathy as “a means to an ethical
not-knowing” which “explicitly abjures knowledge based on erasure” (10). This form of
sympathy  is  grounded  in  ethics  rather  than  epistemology;  it  involves  the
acknowledgement of difference rather than the presumption of sameness; it enables
care  rather  than  subjugation.  It  is,  in  other  words,  a  “benevolent  skepticism”  (19)
which understands selfhood as shifting, relational, and ever unfathomable. With this
claim, Noble positions herself,  if  implicitly, within recent debates in literary studies
about the perceived exhaustion of critique (Latour), our increasing “disenchantment
with disenchantment” (Bentley 291), the necessity to favor “reparative” readings over
“paranoid” interpretations (Sedgwick), and the importance to extricate hermeneutic
practices from a sterile depth drive to privilege tactful engagement with surfaces (Best
and Marcus, Felski).
2 Interestingly, Noble locates these very debates as already animating the antebellum
period,  which  allows  her  to  frame  her  argument  as  a  series  of  embedded  and
overlapping  revisionary  moves,  as  if  the  individual  stories  of  her  authors’  careers
offered a mise en abyme of the history of criticism itself and as if the nineteenth century
provided  a  mirror  to  our  contemporary  conversations.  Literally  bookending  her
analysis,  Emerson and Melville  are  taken as  representative  figures  of  sympathy-as-
epistemology and its skeptical impasse. Their writings, in “Experience” and Moby-Dick
especially, dramatize the desire to penetrate social masks in the hope of unveiling the
true selves that lie behind. They also epitomize the frustration of that desire and its
attendant,  despairing  skepticism  at  the  possibility  to  ever  enter  into  contact  with
others and with the world. In chapter 1, Emerson’s essays provide a first instantiation
of  Noble’s  revisionary  method:  from  Nature to  “Experience”  and  “Nominalist  and
Realist,” Emerson is seen to revise his early belief in cosmic harmony, after the death of
his son in 1842 confronted him with the realization that “failures of human contact”
were  “endemic  to  human nature”  (42).  Emerson scholars  will  be  familiar  with  this
narrative, but it does help Noble to articulate the two limitations that she discerns in
Emerson’s thinking about sympathy, contact, and relationality: its impersonality and
its  self-centeredness.  In  the  end,  Noble  argues,  Emerson’s  sympathy  goes  out  to
impersonal  nature the better to come back to the self-reliant individual,  instead of
being directed towards caring for others. As Emerson himself claimed forcefully in the
Divinity School “Address,” “the soul knows no persons” (81). Although Noble does not
cite this aphorism, it exemplifies her critique of Emersonian Transcendentalism as a
philosophy in which others are but an encumbrance. She then turns to Thoreau, Louisa
May  Alcott  and  Whitman  as  further  Transcendentalist  revisions.  Moving  from
Thoreau’s excursion to Mount Ktaadn in The Maine Woods, where contact is primarily an
experience of the nonhuman, to Alcott’s Behind a Mask, where contact is less a matter of
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unmasking  than  of  performance  and  performativity,  to  Whitman’s  Calamus,  which
develops a phenomenology of embodied and homoerotic touch, Noble demonstrates
how these authors progressively challenge the “Emersonian framework” (58), all the
while “[thinking] within this framework” (85), committed as they remain to Emerson’s
setting of  the conversation’s  terms and to his  notion that persons are the problem
rather than the solution to the issue of social relations.
3 The  subsequent  chapters  show  how  Hawthorne,  Douglass,  Stowe,  and  Dickinson
charted “a different path, one that embraces persons as part of the project of human
contact”  (85).  More  accurately,  Noble  reveals  how  these  authors  both  revised  the
Emersonian framework and revised themselves as they kept on writing. In the case of
Hawthorne, the Puritan legacy superimposed on the Transcendentalist perspective to
make “human contact  […]  both an existential  and a  social  necessity”  (86).  In  “The
Minister’s Black Veil” and The Scarlet Letter, however, sympathy amounts to unveiling
inner  truths  and  proves,  by  virtue  of  its  epistemological  pull,  paradoxically
unsympathetic. By contrast, The House of the Seven Gables is seen to model sympathy as
affective  presence  and  tactful  care.  Yet  contact  in  the  novel  remains  fleeting  and
unstable, so that Hawthorne’s theorization of sympathy as positively enabling proves
ultimately unsatisfactory. It  is especially inadequate as it  fails to extend to African-
Americans whom Hawthorne is portrayed as being unable to sympathize with. Yet in
this view, the failure is Hawthorne’s – or his texts’ – rather than sympathy’s, which
allows Noble to rescue the concept to put it to further examination in the following
chapter. 
4 Chapter  3  focuses  on  Douglass  and  provides  perhaps  the  most  explicit  example  of
revisionary writing, since Douglass famously revised his own 1845 narrative ten years
later  in  My  Bondage  and  My  Freedom.  Foregrounding  revision  as  a  process  of  self-
assertion, Douglass seems indeed particularly suited to Noble’s critical project. Close
reading  and  comparing  passages  from  the  1845  text  and  its  1855  rewriting,  Noble
contends that, while the former depicts how slavery destroys all forms of selfhood, the
latter brings into focus the possibilities of both black resistance and white empathy.
From  this  perspective,  the  mechanics  of  the  1855  text  spur  simultaneously,  and
contradictorily, identification and surprise on the part of white readers. On the one
hand, white readers are invited to recognize in the slave a self that is similar to theirs
because he does not think of himself exclusively as a slave. On the other hand, they are
meant  to  experience  surprise  for  exactly  the  same  reason:  by  dissociating  black
selfhood from the condition of enslavement, Douglass offers a defamiliarizing picture
that  challenges  white  expectations.  In  the  end,  these  opposed  motions  foreground
empathy as a matter of “positionality” (159) rather than identification, thus privileging
what Edward Said has called “mental travel” over essentializing impulses (160). The
chapter ends with a reading of The Heroic Slave where, Noble contends, Douglass reflects
on “the power of empathy to revise perception” (164) by allowing white readers to
distance themselves from the dominant, white narrative perspective. At the same time
however, the novella imagines aggression and revolt as a path to human contact, one
that evidently parallels and rivals sympathy, which leads Noble to acknowledge the
limits of reading Douglass for empathy.
5 Chapter  4  then turns  to  Stowe to  suggest  that  both  Dred and  The  Minister’s  Wooing
challenge the earlier model of sympathy put forward in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. In Uncle Tom’s
Cabin, as is well known, suffering is posited as universal, which is erroneously supposed
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to  enable  sympathetic  identification through imagined fellow feeling.  Dred and The
Minister’s Wooing for their part are seen to explore gender and race relations away from
professed universality and to articulate an ethics of care “predicated on a refusal to
appropriate another person” (175). This reading allows Noble to cast Stowe’s writing,
much  like  Hawthorne’s  in  chapter  2,  as  prefiguring  Emmanuel  Levinas’s  “ethical
ontology”  and  D.  W.  Winnicott’s  “relational  psychology,”  both  of  which  entail
recognizing and respecting the other as a subject in their own right (182-183). This is
where one of Noble’s most provocative claims comes to light. In Winnicott, the process
of subjective differentiation is part of the self’s development and maturation. From this
perspective, Winnicott’s psychology does not only provide the terminus ad quem for the
genealogy of sympathy and human contact experiences that Noble wishes to trace: it
also models implicitly, and perhaps more problematically, literary writing as itself a
process  of  maturation,  whereby  later  revisions  would,  as  if  by  virtue  of  their
belatedness, refine and improve earlier figurations.
6 Finally,  chapter  5  engages  with  Dickinson’s  poetry  and  correspondence  to  chart  a
similar evolution from an understanding of sympathy as “affective fusion” (201) to the
notion  of  sympathy  as  “Sweet  Skepticism  of  the  Heart”  (207,  F 1438).  Through
meticulous close readings of several letters’ and poems’ lexicon, syntax, and scansion,
Noble  brings  to  the  fore  what  she  terms  “the  caring  core  of  Dickinson’s  caustic
thought” (215). Among the many figures that Noble unfolds, the paronomasia between
“meet” and “meat” that structures the 1865 poem “Experiment to Me” (F 1081b) best
encapsulates Dickinson’s effort  to turn away from predatory encounters,  where the
persona is hungering after the “Meat within,” and towards what an 1863 poem calls “a
wiser sympathy” (237, F 780). In the context of the latter poem, this “wiser sympathy”
is understood as a new social and political “contract.” Differing from readings which
emphasize the decline of affective bonds and the rise of contractual relations in the
United States in the wake of the Civil War, Noble argues that sympathy, now reframed
as  benevolent  skepticism,  remains  the  cornerstone  of  sociality  such  as  Dickinson
imagines it. Yet she concludes that the kind of contact enabled by this new form of
sympathy remains “limited,” as the poem does not go beyond the affirmation of “basic
shared bereavement” between the persona and the addressee (238). This allows Noble
to distance Dickinson from her text and to suggest that her poetry, though it makes
valuable step in that direction, does not fully bear out its promise to rethink sympathy. 
7 By the end of Noble’s investigation, this move will be familiar to her readers, insofar as
it  recurrently concludes her reading of  each of  her chosen authors.  Although their
writings may help us begin the process of reconfiguring sympathy, none of them offers
a  completely  satisfactory  model  in  the  end.  This  must  not,  however,  or  so  Noble
contends, lead us to despair sympathy altogether, but rather encourage us to remain
hopeful, which is another way of defending literary criticism as a “practice of hope” in
“disenchanted times,” to quote Christopher Castiglia’s  recent vindication of  literary
studies.  But such  critical  disposition,  or  mood,  also  sounds  very  Emersonian.  As
Emerson once noted in his journal:  “I  am Defeated all  the time; yet to Victory I  am
born.” (JMN, 8: 228) These Transcendentalist echoes eventually bring us back full circle,
for  as  much  as  Marianne  Noble’s  book  looks  ahead  towards  twentieth-century
phenomenology,  ethics,  and  psychology,  and  up  to  very  contemporary  theories  of
affect,  it  is  also a project  of  recovery.  She recovers in particular the figure of  J.  G.
Herder  as  an  overlooked,  but  crucial  interpreter  of  eighteenth-century  Scottish
Common Sense philosophy for antebellum American literary culture. A critical reader
Marianne Noble, Rethinking Sympathy and Human Contact in Nineteenth-Century A...
Transatlantica, 2 | 2018
4
of Hume and Smith, Herder was the first to coin the notion of Einfühlung, which would
be translated into English as empathy in the early twentieth century, and he grounded
his theory of sympathy in holistic pluralism rather than universality, thus providing an
early  alternative  to  the  epistemology  of  sympathy  that  Noble  sees  Hawthorne,
Douglass, Stowe, and Dickinson attempting to revise.
8 As with all strong claims, Marianne Noble’s calls for praise, but also invites discussion
and  debate.  Her  transatlantic  counter-genealogy  of  sympathy,  from  Herder’s
anthropology to Levinas’s ethics through the antebellum United States literature, has
obvious purchase, testifying as it does to the importance of anti-exceptionalist critical
narratives, as well as to the fruitful entanglements of literature and philosophy as one
of  the  more  innovative  fields  of  enquiry  in  recent  nineteenth-century  American
literary  studies.  Yet  her  insistence  that  Hawthorne,  Douglass,  Stowe and Dickinson
“anticipate” Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and Winnicott begs the thorny question of the
historicity  of  literature,  literary  criticism,  and  philosophical  concepts.  While  it
importantly reminds us that ideas do have a history, it also asks us to consider the
temporalities of interpretation, as well as the potentialities of anachronism. Rethinking
Sympathy  and  Human  Contact also  confronts  the  daunting  and  vexed  question  of
literature’s  relation  with  reality  and  authenticity.  For  Noble,  antebellum  American
literature  models  our  relation  to  reality  in  the  form  of  what  she  repeatedly  calls
“genuine human contact” (e.g. 2, 67, 176, 204, 241), that is, the ability to experience
authentic encounters with actual people. Yet with the exception of Whitman’s erotics
of  touch,  the  various  kinds  of  “contact”  that  she  considers  remain,  by  her  own
admission, “essentially metaphorical” (19). This creates a dazzling paradox, whereby
reality  is  ultimately  conceived  of  under  the  aegis  of  metaphor.  Furthermore,
understanding  contact  as  metaphor  leads  to  downplay  other,  more  violent  and
disturbing forms of bodily encounters, as in the case of slavery or war. Admittedly,
these fall outside the scope of this book, but its emphasis on genuineness may be taken
as a license for scholars to further problematize the concept of contact, not only in
opposition  to  social  masquerade,  but  also  in  relation  to  the  biopolitics  of  physical
coercion. One way of going about it would be to attend, as Fred Moten and Stefano
Harney have, to the counterpolitics of “hapticality”: they propose for instance that “the
touch of the undercommons” be understood as “the capacity to feel through others, for
others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you” in ways that are “not
regulated, at least not successfully, by a state, a religion, a people, an empire” (91).
Another  would  be  to  follow the  path  laid  out  by  Naomi  Greyser  in  On  Sympathetic
Grounds: Race, Gender, and Affective Geographies in Nineteenth-Century North America and to
trace how sympathy works towards the distribution of space to produce common as
well as exclusory grounds for contact. What is certain, though, is that, in provoking its
readers  to  reflect  on  the  affordances  of  sympathy  and  the  fraught  possibilities  of
relationality,  Rethinking  Sympathy  and  Human  Contact joins  a  wider  and  important
conversation  about  the  ways  in  which  literature  imagines  togetherness  and  the
functions of sentiments, emotions, and affects within these emplotments. That is not
the least of its merits.
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